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Why good companies misbehave and 
(occasionally) break the competition 
rules 
 
 
 
 
 
23. september 2014 
Why do companies break the law? 
 
 
Falculty of Law 
Dias 2 
The answer emerging from 
enforcers and the public is 
that they gang up against 
the free market 
deliberately, consciously 
and with a malicious intent 
Impact on compliance 
• Most companies adopt a compliance approach 
centered on avoiding careless conversations, 
comments or participation in (secret) meetings with no 
legitimate or clear purpose 
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Impact on compliance 
• Why you might have heard lawyers recommend a 
strong and clear reaction if confronted with any 
such  attempts, e.g. suspicious invitations, in order 
to avoid misunderstandings, or that you should 
“NEVER EVER….” 
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Impact on compliance 
• A prudent approach. A meeting 
followed by parallel behavior does 
look suspicious 
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”Veterinary cartel” 
 
 
 
 
Summary of meeting 
between veterinarians held 
on 6 May 2008 
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However, reality differs 
• The “management cartel” established and 
operated by senior management (that other 
accidently could join) is rare and predominantly 
observable in books, presentations and films 
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However, reality differs 
• Out of 1111 Danish cases decided (and published) 
by the Danish Competition and Consumer 
Authority (1998-2014), 159 could be labeled as 
cartels (an agreement between competitors 
restricting competition) 
• However, 65 cases were closed by exceptions, 
commitments or informal adjustments reducing the 
number of “serious” cartels to 94 
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However, reality differs 
• Further, in 46 of these cases, the parties could 
provide a reasonable explanation mitigating the 
decision: 
a) The association of veterinarians had restricted 
customer shopping following sickness or death of a 
colleague (2014)  
b) The Danish Association of Undertakers had adopted 
a ban on TV advertisements (2010) 
c) Association of Retailers had adopted a 13 point 
agenda to reduce the sale of enriched candy (2007) 
• Hence, this is an infringement, but not an evil 
conspiracy, against the free market 
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However, reality differs 
• Remaining is therefore 48 hardcore cartels (of 
which 36 predate 2000) where no mitigating or 
clear indications that the parties were pursuing 
legitimate (or somewhat legitimate) interests could 
be found 
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Hence, no one intended the infringement 
• The perception is that cartelists willingly enter into 
cartels 
• In reality, most parties never intended any 
infringement as the (real) hardcore cartels 
account for less 1/3 of the observable cartels 
(1998-2014) 
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Hence, no one intended the infringement 
• Rather than focusing on the intended cartels, it 
is the unintended cartels nobody intended to 
establish that should worry compliance officers 
Falculty of Law 
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Many ways to Golgata  
• Many ways to end up in a cartel infringement: 
a) Restrictive contract clauses infringing 
competition law. Best addressed by legal 
department or external attorney review of 
contract prior to conclusions 
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Many ways to Golgata  
• Many ways to end up in a cartel infringement: 
b) Group associated companies (subsidiaries) 
enter into a cartel (intentionally or 
unintentionally). Look for plus factors, e.g. 
exchange of employee, sudden increase of 
profitability or an (bad) incentive scheme 
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Many ways to Golgata  
• Many ways to end up in a cartel infringement: 
a) Careless comments that could be 
misunderstood and indicate unwanted interests 
and opinions  
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Falculty of Law 
Hollywoodwise 
 
Valuable understanding of 
cartels anatomy can be 
obtained through movies as 
cartels become unstable 
without regular meetings 
Dias 16 
Exchange of information 
• Exchange of (internal) and sensitive information 
can establish a cartel rendering it sustainable. 
Attention has therefore rightfully been allotted to 
trade organizations and their exchange of 
information: 
• Trade organizations were involved in 38 out of 
94 observed cartels (40%) and 8 out of 48 
hardcore cartels (16%) 
• From a practical point, trade organizations and 
sharing sensitive information appear to be a 
precondition for the long-term sustainability of 
cartels 
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Exchange of information 
• However, it should not preclude (general) 
conversation within trade organizations or fellow 
tradesmen. Members can of course meet and 
engage in conversation relating to their business 
and concerns 
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Exchange of information 
Just exercise caution so that you do not share 
sensitive and internal information or express 
endorsement of things your company has no reel 
interest in 
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Questions 
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